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Formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party
leaders towards the center of the electoral distribution. This paper discusses
various political episodes in British and US history to suggest that political
divergence is generic. This leads to the inference that political choice involves
electoral judgment as well as preference. The stochastic electoral model is
extended to incorporate the basis of judgment, namely valence. The model
suggests that when the electoral system is based on proportional electoral
methods, then there will be numerous parties with very di⁄erent valences,
adopting very divergent positions. Under plurality rule, on the other hand,
the role of activists appears to restrict the number of parties to two, and to
cause a slow political rotation in the policy space.
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1The idea behind this paper is to discuss (Scho￿eld(2006a), which is es-
sentially an extended interpretation of Madison￿ s argument in Federalist X
(1999 [1787]), and uses ideas from social choice theory and from the work
of Douglass North, Mancur Olson and William Riker, in an attempt to de-
velop ￿rational choice￿approaches to the evolution of society. This research
program can be regarded as continuing the work of Madison￿ s contempo-
raries, Condorcet and Laplace. In the later sections of the paper, recent
work on modelling elections ((Scho￿eld and Sened, 2006) is also discussed in
an attempt to evaluate Madison￿ s contention about the ￿probability of a ￿t
choice￿in the Republic.
North￿ s early work with Thomas (North and Thomas, 1973, 1977) at-
tempted an economic explanation of the transition from hunter/gatherer
societies to agriculture. Later, he proposed a ￿neoclassical theory of the
state,￿wherein ￿Leviathan￿contracts to set up a system of property rights
and taxes (North, 1981). His later work has focused on institutions, and how
they change as a result of incentives, knowledge and beliefs (North, 1990,
1994, 2005). One of his most persuasive pieces is his work with Weingast
(North and Weingast, 1989) on the Glorious Revolution in 1688 in Britain,
and how this transformed Britain￿ s ability to manage debt, ￿ght wars (par-
ticularly with France), and develop an empire.
Riker￿ s earliest work was on American Federalism, particularly the logic
underlying the need for Union in 1787 (Riker, 1953, 1964) and the stability
of parties as coalitions (Riker, 1962). After working for a number of years
2on rational choice theory (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973), Riker returned to
American political history, to interpret key events in terms of ￿heresthetic￿
(1982, 1984, 1986, 1996). Riker coined the word heresthetic from the greek
￿￿￿"￿￿￿o￿, meaning ￿able to choose.￿His book on Liberalism Against Pop-
ulism (1982b) argued that social choice theory implied that populism, in the
sense of existence of a ￿general will￿was vacuous. At best, all democracy
could hope for was the liberal capacity to remove autocrats.
Much of Olson￿ s work has attempted to grapple with understanding how
some societies are successful and others much less so. In his early book, Olson
(1965) used the idea of the prisoner￿ s dilemma to suggest that cooperation
may fail, as individuals pursue their sel￿sh ends (by strikes, revolutions,
etc.) and indirectly constrain economic growth. Later, Olson (1982) used
this argument to provide a ￿declinist￿explanation of why stable democracies
such as Britain and the U.S. appeared less vital (in the 1980￿ s) than the newer
democracies of the post World War II era (such as France, Germany, Japan,
etc.).
In this paper I attempt to construct the beginnings of a theory of de-
mocratic choice that I believe can be used as a heuristic device able to tie
together these di⁄ering historical accounts. The basic underlying framework
is adapted from social choice theory, as I understand it, on which I graft a
￿stochastic￿model of elections. This model is an attempt to extend the Con-
dorcetian theme of electoral judgement. I shall argue that its logic was the
formal principle underlying Madison￿ s justi￿cation for the Republican scheme
3of representation that he made in Federalist X. While this logic does not im-
ply a general will in the sense of Rousseau, it does suggest that Riker was
overly pessimistic about the nature of democracy. On the other hand, the
social choice framework suggests that democracy, indeed any polity, must
face di¢ cult choices over what I call chaos and autocracy. These di¢ cult
choices are the constitutional quandaries of the title of this book. The his-
torical choices that I discuss often involve a leader or theorist, an architect of
change, either in the realm of politics or economics, who interprets or frames
the quandary troubling the society in a way that leads to its resolution.
1 Balancing Risk and Chaos
Figure 1 is intended as a schematic representation of the formal results from
social choice theory, suggesting the relationship between the many di⁄ering
results of the theory. The vertical axis denotes the ￿axis of chaos￿ The
theorems of social choice, from the earliest result by Arrow (1951) to the
later work on spatial voting theory (MacKelvey and Scho￿eld, 1986, 1987)
imply that as factionalism increases then utter disorder can ensue. The
term chaos was introduced to describe the possible degree of disorder, by
analogy to mathematical chaos which was used to characterize a deterministic
dynamical system, f with the feature that for almost any pair of outcomes
4x;y, in the state space X there exists a trajectory
x ! f(x) ! f
2(x) ! :::f
t(x) = y: (1)
(See Li and Yorke, 1975).
For a voting rule, with speci￿ed voter preferences and an initial point
x, let f(x) be the set of alternatives that beat x. More generally, we can
think of the set f(x) as the set of alternatives that can come about from x;
as determined by the social rule. The idea of social chaos is that there are
conditions under which, starting from almost any x it is possible to reach
almost any possible outcome y = fn(x) by reiterating the social rule. When
the set Y that can be reached is large, in some sense, then we can call Y the
chaotic domain. In contrast we can identify the core or social equilibrium, y,
as an attractor of f, that is a single outcome y with y = ft(x), which results
from any x; after some number of iterations of the rule. The chaos theorem
sets out the conditions for existence or otherwise of the social equilibrium
and for the situation where the chaotic domain becomes almost the whole of
X. For example, for any voting procedure, f, without a dictator, oligarchy
or collegium,1 able to control or restrain social choice, then as the dimension
of X increases then so does the extent of voting chaos. For social choice,
1Roughly speaking a voting rule is characterized by a family of winning coalitions,
D, say. A dictator is a single agent who belongs to every winning coalitions and is also
winning. An oligarchy is a group that belongs to every winning coalition and is itself
winning, while a collegium is a group of voters that belongs to every winning coalition in
D, but need not be winning.
5the chaos theorem is presented for a voting rule D, with speci￿ed voter
preferences. If D is collegial, in the sense that there is a collegium, then
the core Core(f) of the social rule, f; will generally exist. If D is non-
collegial, then there is an integer, w(D); called the ￿chaos dimension,￿which
characterizes D in the following sense: If the dimension of the space, X;
exceeds w(D) then the chaotic domain, Chaos(f); of the social rule, f; will
be almost the whole of X:
For a general social rule, f; Scho￿eld (1985a) formally de￿nes Chaos(f) in
terms of local cycles of the rule, and then shows that the union of Chaos(f)
and Core(f) is non empty. Thus, if the rule has the property that Chaos(f)
is empty, then Core(f) must be non-empty. The theoretical problem for
democratic theory, is that if Chaos(f) for the social rule, f; is non-empty
then there may be no social equilibrium. However, as discussed at length
below, it may be the case that democratic power resides in veto groups.
Since a veto group is a collegium in some limited domain of policy (namely
a subset of X), then Chaos(f) will be empty, and the social chaos theorem
will not apply. There has been much debate about the applicability of the
social chaos result to democratic theory. See for example Riker (1980, 1982,
1984, 1986). Note however that chaos, as I interpret it, is not just a property
of voting procedures.
For societies where war is the decision method, then I suggest that the
chaotic domain, Y; is likely to be all of X. For less violent methods, the
chaotic domain will typically depend on the heterogeneity of preferences in
6the society. These results do not imply that democracies are necessarily
chaotic, but they do suggest that they can be.3 Throughout this book I shall
use the term ￿chaos,￿somewhat loosely, to refer to a social situation where
there is reason to believe that it is impossible to determine even in general
terms, where the social trajectory will go.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
When war, or intense and unrestrained con￿ ict dominates, then we can
expect chaos, as in Kosova, in Lebanon during the civil war, and in Iraq
at the present time. For a pessimist like Hobbes, it was obvious that any
society could fall into chaos, unless mitigating institutional devices were con-
structed. The quote from Madison￿ s Federalist X suggests that Madison
certainly viewed direct democracy as subject to chaos. Indeed, in his other
writings, he used the phrase ￿the mutability of the law￿in commenting on
the possible choices of the legislature. I take his comments to mean that he
considered that legislative bodies such as the House and Senate were sub-
ject to a degree of disorder￿ possibly not the complete disorder of chaos. It
should be noted that the chaos theorem refers to situations where individu-
als with speci￿c and heterogeneous preferences come together either in war
or assembly and are in con￿ ict over an outcome. Thus a legislative assem-
bly can be understood as a direct democracy, and consequently can exhibit
chaos, as suggested by the social choice results. Madison was very clear that
representative democracy involves the choice of a person. and he obviously
believed that the voters in the Republic could make a sound choice for the
7Chief Magistrate if their judgements were not contaminated by preferences.
One purpose of this book is to explore the nature of social choice when it
depends on judgement rather than simply individual preferences.
The rationalizability of social choice may hold when an electorate makes
a speci￿c and limited choice, particularly in a binary situation of yes or no.
For example, the negative referenda votes in May and early June, 2005, in
France and the Netherlands over the European Union (EU) Constitution,
while unexpected, cannot be seen as truly chaotic, because they were one-o⁄
events. However the frantic responses by the political leaders of the EU may
have elements of considerable disorder. At the same time, there are many
institutional devices within the EU that are designed to control disorder.
The e⁄ect of these institutional ￿equilibrium￿devices are well understood
from the point of view of social choice theory. They all force ￿rationality￿
by concentrating power in various ways. This is shown in Figure 1 by the
power characteristics of the decision rule, f, along the risk axis. The work,
mentioned above, on social choice by Arrow (1951) considered a very strong
rationality axiom. Using this he showed that if this rationality property is
to be satis￿ed then the most extreme form of power concentration, namely
￿dictatorship￿ is a necessary condition in the case that individual prefer-
ences are unconstrained. Less extreme forms of power concentration include
existence of an￿oligarchy,￿or ￿collegium￿or multiple veto groups. Because
a ￿dictator￿can make any choice ￿he￿deems ￿t, and such a degree of power
concentration almost never occurs in a polity, I shall use the term ￿autocrat￿
8for one who controls the levers of power of the polity, and has at least the
ability to declare war without being constrained by some form of political
veto. Clearly, Saddam Hussein was not a dictator, in the formal sense, but
he certainly was an autocrat. Similarly, I use the term ￿oligarchy￿ for a
group who if they agree, have ￿autocratic￿powers. A ￿collegium￿is a group
without full autocratic powers, but who must all agree before the exercise of
such power to pursue war etc. A ￿veto group￿is one with collegial power
within a speci￿c restricted domain of policy. Obviously there can be many
veto groups in any complex society.
Figure 1 presents my hypothesis that autocrats are likely to be extreme
risk takers. To some degree, this is an empirical assertion. One only need
make a list: Ghenghis Khan, Attila, Philip II of Spain, Napoleon, Hitler,
Stalin. Kennedy￿ s book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Kennedy,
1987) argued that great nations tend to over-exert themselves in the military
realm, and through lack of ￿scal caution, bring about their own demise. If we
translate this argument by regarding the lack of ￿scal caution as an element
of risk taking more generally, then Kennedy￿ s logic certainly seems valid for
Philip II and Napoleon, and possibly for the leaders of the USSR during
the cold war. Kennedy also argued that it applied to the U.S. in the post
World war situation. Scho￿eld (2006a) gives the relevant data on military
spending for the U.S. and USSR up until 1991, and suggests that there was
little indication of this risk preferring military incaution by the U.S. until
that date. Whether the same inference is valid today is another question
9entirely.
On the risk axis, an autocrat is likely to be much more risk taking than
an oligarchy. I also suppose that an oligarchy will tend to be more risk taking
than a collegium. It is di¢ cult to precisely di⁄erentiate between an oligarchy
and a collegium. An example of an oligarchy was the Praesidium of the Soviet
Union. All members of the Praesidium must agree, in principle, for a choice
to be made, but if they do, then no decision making body can override them.
A possible example of a collegium is the U.S. president together with his
cabinet, in a situation where the majority parties of the House and Senate
are in line with the President, and agree with his policy initiatives. The
more general situation, of course, is where the President may veto Congress,
and Congress may, in turn, counter his veto, with a super-majority. Thus
the U.S. executive and Congress, regarded as a unit, can be interpreted as
having collegial power. Because the Congressional counter-veto requires a
supermajority, only very extreme situations can lead to chaos as a result of
Presidential/Congressional interaction. Note, however, that President and
Congress together do not comprise an oligarchy, since there are obvious policy
domains in which Congress and President may concur, but are blocked by
State Legislatures.2
Because Congress may be factionalized, it can, as Madison expected,
2Gore (2007) has argued that this balance between President and Congress has been
much weakened during the Presidency of George Bush, in particular because of Bush￿ s
use of "signing statements" where he asserts that he will not be bound by portions of
Congressional legislation.
10exhibit what he called ￿mutability￿ ￿ a degree of disorder or incoherence in
the laws that are passed. My understanding of the U.S. Constitution is that it
had a precise design to allow the Presidential veto to overcome Congressional
mutability. Of course, if there is a well disciplined majority party in Congress,
then it can act as a collegium, thus ensuring stability of some kind. However,
it is certainly possible for Congress to become factionalized, leading to the
collapse of the collegium. One instance of this was the Presidential election
of 1844 and its aftermath. Because of the actions of Southern Democrats
in blocking the candidacy of the New York Democrat, Martin Van Buren,
the Northern and Southern wings of the Democrat party split, and Northern
Democrats voted with Northern Whigs to suspend the gag rule, forbidding
discussion of the issue of slavery in the House. This factionalization led
eventually to a realignment of the party structure in the election of 1860.
Madison, of course, was concerned that the President would gain auto-
cratic power, and to avoid this, the Congressional counter-veto was devised.
However, even with the counter-veto, the President does have some autocratic
power, and I shall use the term weak autocrat to characterize his power. It
is evident that there is a tendency for U.S. presidents to display the degree
of risk preference that characterizes autocrats. I judge that Congress will
generally be risk-averse, which is why, I believe, power to declare war resides
in Congress. Even when Congress and President are aligned, then one would
still expect the Presidential risk-preference to be muted by Congressional
risk-avoidance.
11On the other hand, Congressional risk-avoidance has the e⁄ect of delay-
ing the resolution of fundamental constitutional quandaries. Typically, a
quandary can only be faced if there is a risk-taking leader capable of forcing
resolution. Without such a leader,the result can be the opposite of chaos,
namely ￿gridlock.￿An illustration of this is given in Scho￿eld (2006a), in
the discussion of the passage of Civil Rights legislation in 1957, while John-
son was leader of the Senate Decisions in the Senate can be blocked by
the ￿libuster, and this can only be overcome by ￿cloture.￿This rule required
￿support from two-thirds of those present and voting to impose cloture. This
meant that a minority coalition of one-third plus one of those present and
voting could prevent a vote￿(Rohde and Shepsle, 2005). First, as leader of
the Senate, and later as President in 1964, Johnson was a risk taker able
to persuade the collegium (of one-third plus one) of Southern Democrats to
lift its block. However, in 1968, Johnson nominated Abe Fortas to be Chief
Justice and the nomination was ￿libustered. The cloture vote in October
failed by 45 to 43, and Johnson had to withdraw the nomination.
Rohde and Shepsle (2005) go on to observe that
as a consequence of a huge upsurge in ￿libusters in the decade follow-
ing the civil rights revolution, Rule 22 was amended in 1975, changing the
requirement to an absolute standard ￿sixty votes ￿to close debate [in the
Senate].
Obviously a group of 41 Senators has blocking power, and the change
in the rule has somewhat reduced the collegial veto power of such a minor-
12ity. The ￿libuster is still important. In July, 2006, 32 Senate Republicans
were joined by 4 Democrats in voting against cloture on the Immigration
Reform bill, and this was repeated in June 2007, when 38 Republicns and 12
Democrats voted against cloture.
Scho￿eld (2006a) argues that Madison developed his argument in Feder-
alist X, from Condorcet￿ s Essai of 1785. This led Madison to expect that
the election of the President could be assumed to be characterized by a
high ￿probability of a ￿t choice.￿In constrained situations where we may
assume that judgements predominate, and voters evaluate the options in a
clear sighted fashion, then their choice of Chief Magistrate may indeed be
well formed in this way. For this reason I locate the weak autocrat in Fig-
ure 1 at a position where the risk taking of the autocrat is balanced by the
risk avoidance of the Congress, as well as by judgement of the electorate. It
would be natural to assume that electoral judgement will generally be risk-
avoiding. However, there are situations where a society feels threatened in
some fashion, and may exhibit a degree of risk preference. It seems to me that
the current situation with regard to the U.S. and Iraq is unusual, precisely
because the electoral judgement has seemed to be much more risk preferring
than is common. As the true risks of the current situation become apparent,
this risk-posture may change.
It is important for my interpretation of electoral judgement that when the
￿preferences￿of the electorate are muted by judgements, then their choice
of the Chief Magistrate need not be subject to the chaos results. Whether
13this is an entirely valid argument is a somewhat delicate matter. Madison
hoped that, because the election of the Chief Magistrate involved the selection
of a person, rather than an option (as in the passage of a law), judgement
rather than preference or interest would predominate. To argue this formally
requires analysis of an electoral model where judgement and preference are
both incorporated. Below, I present the tentative outline of such a model.
It is of course entirely possible that beliefs or judgements in the electorate
can be transformed in a chaotic fashion. Many of the illustrations of belief
transformation suggest that while the transformations are highly contingent,
they are associated with changes in what I call a core belief. In social choice
theory. A core, in social choice theory is an unbeaten alternative. By analogy,
a core belief is a belief that has general acceptance in the society. 3
As Figure 1 indicates, at the opposite end of the risk spectrum from
autocracy is the situation of extreme risk-avoiding blocking groups. Veto
groups are like collegia but with power in a limited domain. As indicated
above, social choice theory implies that veto groups induce stability, so the
e⁄ect is the opposite of chaos. A good illustration is provided by the veto
power that French farmers have over changes in the EU Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). Obviously French farmers, together with their agrarian allies
in Germany, and the new members of the EU, such as Poland, have a great
deal to lose if the CAP is reorganized. CAP is only one instance of a variety
3Of course, core beliefs can change rapidly. A core belief in the U.S. electorate was that
there existed a close connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, and this belief
provided the justi￿cation for the invasion of Iraq. This belief has turned out to be false.
14of protectionist, risk-averse mechanisms that several veto groups have been
allowed to deploy in the expanding European polities. The consequence
seems to be that the core polities of France, Germany and Italy in Europe
had stagnating economies for a number of years.. Growth rates in 2005 were
under 2 percent (1.8 percent in France, 1.1 percent in Germany, and about
zero in Italy). Recently however, the estimates for Germany and France were
3% and 2% respectively, although unemployment is still a problem.
Social choice theory suggests that the EU quandary over the reorganiza-
tion of its labour markets and a constitutional basis for expansion to the east
could be resolved by the selection of a weak autocrat, such as a popularly
elected EU President. However, to satisfy Madison￿ s fears of autocracy, it
would be necessary for the electoral choice to be based on the judgements of
voters rather than their preferences. It is di¢ cult to see how a European wide
election could have an information base that would be su¢ cient to support
such a social choice based on judgement.
With this preamble in mind, I shall attempt to formulate a Madisonian
model of election of the Chief Magistrate, President or political leader, that
is in principle applicable to any democratic polity. The model will involve
both judgement and preference. Variations of the basic model can then be
interpreted in terms of a pure Condorcetian model of judgement, or belief
aggregation, as well as a pure, potentially chaotic model of preference aggre-
gation.
152 Preferences and Judgements
For the formal electoral model I shall assume that individuals have prefer-
ences that are can be represented as functions on some ￿policy￿space X.
This space characterizes both voter interests, and possible eventualities. In
many of the examples, I argue that X conceptually derives from the societal
deployment of the three factors of land, labor and capital. Because the fac-
tors are bounded at any time, we may more conveniently regard X as two
dimensional. In empirical applications, for example, surveys nearly always
indicate that voters conceive of a con￿ ict between the requirements of capital
and labor. What I term the labor axis is often derived from beliefs about
civil rights or religion. A third non-factor dimension may involve attitudes
to war. In some cases the social attitudes with regard to war are attributable
to the desire for territorial expansion. Obviously this notion of factor dimen-
sions is a heuristic device, but it does allow me to represent fundamental
constitutional problems in a diagrammatical form.
The interests or beliefs of the population or ￿electorate,￿N (of size n) are
described by a set fxig of ￿ideal points,￿one for each ￿voter,￿i = 1;:::;n.
An individual￿ s ideal point in the space, X, is used to describe or represent
that voter￿ s interests. In electoral models the ideal point can be obtained
from a survey. Whether we view xi as representing preferences or beliefs is
immaterial.
The set of options, S, of size s, is a set fzjg, each one being a point in X.
16In the situation of an election, each element of S is a declaration of
intended or proposed policy. There is one for each candidate, j.
While it is usual to conceive of each zj as simply a point, we can easily
allow zj to involve various possibilities, associated with di⁄ering probabilities
of occurrence. In principle we can construct a more general model where
beliefs are probabilities of outcomes, so the possible states are lotteries.
In the simplest model, the ￿latent utility,￿uij of voter i for candidate j
has the form





j ￿i models the e⁄ect of the sociodemographic characteristics ￿i
of voter i in making a political choice. That is, ￿j is a k-vector specifying
how the various sociodemographic variables appear to in￿ uence the choice
for option j:Thus ￿
T
j ￿i is simply the in￿ uence of i￿ s sociodemographic char-
acteristics on the propensity to choose j.
The term Aij(xi;zj) is a way of representing the ￿preference disagree-
ment￿ between the interests of voter i and the jth option. In particular
Aij(xi;zj) may be some function of the distance between xi, the preferred
position (or ideal point) of voter i and zj, the declared policy of candidate
j, according to some appropriate metric. In the standard electoral model,
where X is a policy space it is assumed that Aij(xi;zj) = ￿kxi ￿ zjk2 is
the Euclidean quadratic loss (with ￿ > 0) associated with the di⁄erence be-
tween the two positions. We can however conceive of Aij(xi;zj) much more
17generally. In the general case zj will involve a lottery across di⁄erent possi-
bilities, and di⁄erent individuals could evaluate these various possibilities in
heterogeneous ways.
The model is stochastic because of the implicit assumption that
￿ij(xi) = ￿j(xi) + "j for j = 1;:::;s: (3)
Here f"jg is a set of possibly correlated disturbances and ￿j(xi) is the
perception by a voter, i, with beliefs or interests, xi, of the ￿valence￿of the
option presented by the candidate j. This valence is a way of modelling the
non policy judgement by voter i of the quality of candidate j.
In the general model, the probability, Pr, that voter i chooses option j is
￿ij = Pr[uij(xi;zj) > uij(xi;zk) for all k 6= j]: (4)
Previous versions of this model have assumed that the valence compo-
nents f￿j(xi)g are all zero, and have usually asserted that all candidates
would converge to an ￿electoral mean￿when they attempt to maximize their
expected vote shares. It is argued that, in the situation where the candidate
valences di⁄er, then this mean voter theorem will only hold when a partic-
ular necessary condition is satis￿ed. The condition depends on the valence
di⁄erences between candidates, on the coe¢ cient ￿ that speci￿es the impor-
tance of policy, and on the variation of the distribution of voter ideal points,
denoted as v2. Further, the greater is the stochastic variance (or uncertainty)
18of the disturbances, then the easier is it for this condition to be satis￿ed. In
contrast, high electoral variation will tend to produce divergence of candi-
date positions. The upshot of this analysis is that empirical situations can
be found where convergence in candidate positions is very unlikely to occur.
Scho￿eld and Sened (2006), give examples from a number of polities based on
proportional electoral systems where extreme divergence of party positions
is explained by this model.
We can apply this model in various ways.
First, consider the pure preference based ￿non-stochastic￿or determinis-
tic case, "j ! 0, where valence is zero.
As noted above, a very extensive literature has shown that if decision
making is binary (pitting options one against another), and based on majority
rule, or more generally on a non-collegial voting mechanism, then ￿chaos￿or
disorder can ensue as long as the dimension of X is su¢ ciently large. The
formal results show that chaos can be prevented by requiring that there be
a collegium or veto player. The outcome in this situation of a collegium,
oligarchy or autocrat may be a core or institutional equilibrium. In the
absence of a core, and if the dimension of X is su¢ ciently low, then the set
of probable outcomes will be restricted, and I shall use the term the heart of
the institution to refer to this set of possible outcomes.
In the stochastic situation, with "j 6= 0, it is necessary to focus on the
￿beliefs￿or judgements of the participants.
In the case that ￿ ! 0, then this is a situation of pure ￿belief aggre-
19gation.￿Individuals will choose among the various options with probability
determined by the valence judgement that they have made. I suggest that
the ￿nal decision is often the consequence of what I call a belief cascade. As
more individuals decide that option zs, say, is superior, then other voters
will in turn, be swayed to form a judgement in favor of zs. I use the term
Architect of change for an agent, j, who is able to trigger this change in the
social situation by providing a plausible argument for the option zj.
In the more general case with ￿ 6= 0, the valences f￿j(xi)g and therefore
the choices will depend on fxig. It may be the case that di⁄erent, and
opposed belief cascades are generated in the population. For example, I
suggest that Lincoln￿ s arguments, about the signi￿cance of the Dred Scott
decision, generated opposing belief cascades in the northern and southern
electorates.
More generally, suppose that there is information available to some subset
M of the electorate which is consistent with the judgment
￿s > ￿s￿1 > ::: > ￿1: (5)
by the members of M. Then it will be the case that, for every voter i in M,
the subjective probabilities will be ranked
￿is > ￿is￿1 > ::: > ￿i1: (6)
It follows that the majority rule preference within the set M will choose
20candidate s with option zs with greater probability than candidates s￿1;s￿
2;:::;3;2;1. If M is itself a majority under the electoral rule (or is a winning
coalition of more than half the electorate) then candidate s will win. When
an alternative such as zs wins in this fashion, then it will be sustained by a
belief (or set of related beliefs) held by a wining coalition. By analogy with
the idea of a core, or unbeaten alternative, I use the term a core belief to
refer to this common belief held by such a set of voters.
Condorcet in his Essai of 1785 argued essentially that a core belief would
tend to be a correct belief. Roughly speaking, Condorcet￿ s Jury Theo-
remasserts that, in a binary choice situation, the probability that a majority
selects the true outcome will be greater than the probability that a typical
individual will select the truth. Rae (1969) and Scho￿eld (1972a,b) used a
version of the theorem to argue that majority rule would be ￿rationally￿cho-
sen by an uncertain society as a constitutional rule. The theorem depends
on the condition of voter (pairwise) independence￿which is a very strong
assumption, and unlikely to be satis￿ed. Recent work by Ladha and Miller
(1996) has attempted to extend the theorem to include correlated choice.
Empirical techniques also allow for modelling correlated choices (Scho￿eld,
Martin, Quinn and Whitford, 1998; Quinn, Martin and Whitford, 1999). The
demonstration of this theorem is usually given for the case where only judge-
ments are involved. but it is obvious that the result holds in some weaker
sense when both interests and judgements are involved, as long as interests
do not predominate. It is argued in Scho￿eld (2006a) that Madison had a
21version of this argument in mind when he wrote about the ￿probability of a
￿t choice￿for the President in Federalist X. Of course, because interests may
intrude in the calculation of a ￿t choice, we cannot assert, as did Condorcet,
that the choice is necessarily superior. Notice also that the electoral rule
(such as deployed in the Electoral College) may de￿ne a coalition as winning
even though it does not comprise a majority. Recent literature has considered
extensions of the Jury Theorem when individuals have private information
and the decision problem is one of common value, so that all individuals
would agree over the correct choice if they had full information. The societal
decisions considered here have the characteristic that both preferences and
beliefs in the society are heterogeneous. I do not attempt to present a full
theory of such situations. Instead I hope to combine elements of social choice
theory and the theory of elections, to present a set of concepts that I feel can
be useful in understanding democratic choice
Thus the core belief underpins the selection of the option s, with the
greatest valence. I also use the notion of the heart of the Constitution to
refer to the con￿guration of beliefs that form the foundation for social choice
at each point in time. A constitutional quandary is a situation of great
uncertainty in the electorate. In the formal model this is associated with sig-
ni￿cant stochastic variance, and relatively insigni￿cant valences. According
to the standard electoral model all candidates should converge to the elec-
toral center. Another way of expressing this is that the candidates should be
risk averse. However, this assertion only holds true if the electoral variation
22is relatively small. If electoral preferences are very heterogeneous then can-
didates should rationally adopt very di⁄erent positions.8 We might say, for a
situation with very great uncertainty, that these candidates for the attention
of the electorate are prophets of chaos. Sometimes, out of this cacophony of
voices, there is one who can overcome the barriers to clear perception and
present a sensible way to interpret the quandary. Naturally, this does not
always happen. I suggest that a polity will prosper when it is both open to
the arguments of such an architect of change, and able to evaluate the oppos-
ing arguments. The evolution of the Constitution is due to this continuous
process of argument, shifting beliefs and changing valences.
This model is applied in Miller and Scho￿eld (2003) and Scho￿eld and
Miller (2007) to suggest that the changing valences of parties in the U.S. is
due to the in￿ uence of activists on candidate positions. This accounts for
what I call a structurally stable dynamic, involving a slow rotation of party
positions in what I consider to be a fundamental two dimensional policy
space based on economic factors and civil rights . There is some evidence
that a two-dimensional policy space is also relevant for Britain (Scho￿eld,
2005a), though I suggest below that the second dimension may be derived
from, or sustained by, beliefs that were appropriate during the period of
the British Empire. While my discussion largely focuses on Britain and the
United States, it is the larger question of the evolution of what I call the
Atlantic Constitution that forms the narrative of Scho￿eld (2006a).
233 An ￿Institutional Narrative￿ : Applying North
and Riker
Here I shall brie￿ y sketch the narrative scheme that I shall use, based on
the ideas of social choice, and on the notion of factor coalitions, forming in
the policy space. Rogowski (1989) earlier made use of the assumption, from
economic theory, that there can be assumed to be three factors of production:
land, labor and capital. External and internal features may grant advantages
to particular coalitions of these factor ￿interests.￿For example, the U.S. in
the late 1700￿ s could be characterized as abundant in land, with both labor
and capital relatively scarce. Principal imports were manufactures, intensive
in capital and skilled labor. Thus protection in the form of tari⁄s would
necessarily bene￿t capital and ￿industrial labor.￿In contrast, since land was
abundant, this economic interest, together with ￿agricultural labor,￿would
bene￿t from free trade. Consequentially, the political con￿ ict between the
commercial Federalist Party and the agrarian Je⁄ersonian Republicans, at
the election of 1800, can be interpreted in factor terms. However, some of
the elements of the controversy of that time can only be understood with
respect to earlier factor con￿ icts in Britain, in the period from 1688.
North and Weingast (1989) had argued that the creation of the Bank of
England in 1693 provided a method of imposing credible commitment on Par-
liament. The dilemma facing any government of that time was that war had
become more expensive than government revenue could cover. Consequently,
24governments, or monarchs, became increasingly indebted. Risk-preferring, or
war-loving, monarchs, such as Philip II of Spain or Louis XIV of France, were
obliged to borrow. As their debt increased, they were forced into repudia-
tion, thus making it more di¢ cult in the future to borrow. Since the Bank of
England ￿managed￿the debt in Britain after 1693, there was an incentive for
Parliament to accept the necessary taxation, and also to avoid repudiation.
However, it was clear after 1688 that William III would pursue the war with
France with great vigor and cost. Contrary to the argument of North and
Weingast, this escalating debt could, in fact, force Parliament to repudiation.
Until 1720, it was not obvious how Parliament could be obliged to commit
to ￿scal responsibility. How this was done was through the brilliant strategy
of Robert Walpole, ￿rst ￿prime￿minister.
The fundamental problem was that the majority of members of both
Commons and Lords were of the landed interest. The obvious method of
funding government debt (which had risen to 36 million pounds sterling by
1713) was by a land tax. Indeed the land tax raised approximately 50 per-
cent of revenue. War weariness had brought in a Tory government in 1710,
and the obvious disinclination of the Tory landed gentry to pay increasing
land taxes forced up the interest rate on long term government debt from 6
percent to 10 percent (Stasavage, 2002). In some desperation the government
created the South Sea Company in 1711. After Queen Anne died in 1714,
and the Hanoverian, George I, became sovereign, increasing speculation in
South Sea Company stock and then the collapse of the ￿bubble￿in Septem-
25ber 1720, almost bankrupted the government. Walpole stabilized con￿dence
in the Company by a swap arrangement with the Bank of England. In April
1721, Walpole, now Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Trea-
sury, began his scheme to stabilize government debt by instituting a complex
system of customs and excise. By restricting imports, mostly foodstu⁄s and
land intensive commodities, this system had the e⁄ect of supporting the price
of the scarce commodity, land. From 1721 to 1740, these excise taxes and
customs raised an increasing share of government revenue. As Brewer (1988)
has described, the system required a sophisticated and skilled bureaucracy.
The Walpole device had many e⁄ects. Firstly, it ushered in a long period of
Whig dominance (at least until the 1800￿ s). Protection of land remained in
place until the Repeal of the Corn Laws in May 1846. As McLean (2000) has
described, the Repeal was e⁄ected by Robert Peel, leader of the Tories (or
conservatives), together with Wellington in the Lords, against the interests
of the majority of their party. Famine in Ireland made it obvious to Peel and
Wellington that unless food prices were lowered then social unrest could lead
to civil strife. The Walpole ￿bargain￿of 1721 essentially created a compact
between the ￿commercial￿Whig interests and both Whig and Tory ￿landed￿
interests. By supporting land prices, the bargain led to increased investment
in agriculture, and (possibly counter-intuitively) the decline of the agricul-
tural labor force. Increased food prices may have reduced the real wage of
industrial labor (Floud and McClosky, 1994). Although agricultural output
increased in Britain, the population grew even more rapidly, and Britain
26became increasingly dependant on food imports, particularly from the U.S.
Je⁄erson was well aware of the implications of the Walpole bargain. His
reading of the works of Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, led him to
believe that the land-capital bargain led to corruption, as well as the ￿lling
of Parliament by placemen. In fact, Bolingbroke￿ s arguments against Wal-
pole were, to some degree, invalid, since the compact did make it possible for
Britain to manage its debt, ￿ght its wars and create an empire. Bolingbroke￿ s
logic was, however, valid for the U.S. Hamilton￿ s attempt in 1793 to recreate
Walpole￿ s system would have necessitated both a land tax and tari⁄ protec-
tion. Since U.S. imports were primarily manufactures, a tari⁄ would protect
the scarce factor, capital, associated with these imports. In Je⁄erson￿ s view,
this would have disadvantaged the landed interest. By creating an agrar-
ian coalition, essentially of the Southern slave-owning landed interest, and
western free farmers, Je⁄erson created a long-lasting compact under which
the U.S. became the food supplier for Britain. Just as the Walpole compact
persisted until 1846, so did Je⁄erson￿ s agrarian coalition survive until 1860.
At that point, the southern demand for expansion to the Paci￿c destroyed
the Je⁄ersonian-Jacksonian Democracy.
The aftermath of the Civil War created a new coalition, of commercial
interests and industrial labor, as represented by the presidential victory of
the Republican, McKinley, over the populist Democrat, William Jennings
Bryan in 1896. From this perspective, U.S. politics in the period 1896-1956
can be interpreted in terms of a single factor dimension, capital, since we can
27regard the interest of land to be generally in opposition to capital. Thus, for
the period from 1896 until the 1930￿ s, the inclination of Republicans for the
preservation of a hard money or gold standard rule was in opposition to the
need for available credit in the agricultural sector.
In the 1960￿ s, agitation for greater civil rights brought the labor axis into
prominence. L. B. Johnson￿ s positioning on this axis contributed to his great
electoral victory in 1964, but also opened the way for the Republican Party
to adopt an increasingly conservative position on the social dimension and
gain political control in the southern states (Miller and Scho￿eld, 2003).
In Britain, since 1846, all these factors have played a r￿le at various
times. For example, McLean (2002) has observed that the success of the
Reform Bill, under the Conservative, Disraeli, in 1867, depended on beliefs
about Empire. For industrial labor, ￿Empire￿meant the opportunities for
emigration and a better life in the Dominions of America, Canada and South
Africa. By using the rhetoric of ￿Empire,￿the conservatives could hope to
appeal to working class voters. In fact, such rhetoric was an important as-
pect of Thatcher￿ s electoral success in the 1980￿ s. Indeed, recent empirical
analysis of electoral beliefs in Britain (Scho￿eld, 2005a) make it clear that in
addition to the usual economic (or ￿capital￿ ) axis, it is necessary to employ
a second ￿social￿axis. This axis incorporates ￿civil rights,￿but is also char-
acterized by attitudes to European Union. Conservative MP￿ s responses to
a questionnaire on this topic suggest that they are strongly opposed to the
incorporation of Britain within the European Union. In other words, polit-
28ical beliefs, that were founded on an economic rationale dating back over a
hundred years, are still relevant, in a somewhat di⁄erent form, today.
This narrative suggests that preferences, or interests, on economic fac-
tors, or dimensions, play an important role in political decisions. However,
the manner in which these interests are transformed into beliefs is, to a
considerable degree, still a matter of conjecture. Indeed, how these beliefs
take political expression seemingly depends on the perception and strategies
of political leaders such as Walpole, Peele, Disraeli, Franklin, Washington,
Madison, Je⁄erson, Lincoln or Johnson.
It has been a long standing controversy whether political economy is
best described by the concepts of ￿equilibrium￿or ￿chaos￿(Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1998, 1999). In his later work, after 1980, Riker saw chaos
as fundamental property, and focused on key ￿contingent￿ events in U.S.
political history, like the Rati￿cation of the U.S. Constitution in 1787-88, or
the onset of the Civil War in 1860-61.
The brief description of British and U.S. political history o⁄ered here sug-
gests that neither equilibrium nor chaos are accurate descriptions of social
choice. Instead, there can be long periods during which political economic
equilibrium is quite stable. However, equilibria can be destroyed and dra-
matically transformed at key historical periods, as described above.
Scho￿eld (2006a) address these central questions, raised by North, Olson
and Riker. It provides a more detailed overview of the di⁄ering political
economic equilibria in Britain and the U.S., and goes on to discuss how
29Walpole￿ s ￿equilibrium￿ or balancing of Whig and Tory interests set the
scene for British imperial expansion, and gave ammunition to Je⁄erson in
his campaign against Hamilton. The ￿institutional￿narratives then go on to
consider the constitutional transformations in the U.S. in the key periods of
the Revolutionary War, 1776-1783, the formation of the two-party system in
1787-1808, and the period, 1857-1861, leading up to the Civil War.
The general argument is that the theoretical accounts, posing chaos against
centrist equilibrium miss the underlying feature of dynamic stability, in the
U.S. in particular. For example, Miller and Scho￿eld (2003), suggest that
political parties in the U.S. slowly cycle in the two-dimensional policy space
that was created in the period just prior to the Civil War. In certain periods
(such as 1896-1920) the principal axis is one of land/capital. However, in the
more general situation, which has held from 1964 to the present, a second
dimension, the social axis (a re￿ ection of the free labor/slave axis) is also
necessary for understanding political change
The electoral model suggests that the kind of analysis performed by po-
litical leaders such as Franklin, Madison, Je⁄erson, Lincoln and Johnson
transforms social uncertainty into the much more amenable aspect of risk.
Thus plurality, or majority decision-making allows such risk taking political
agents to create solutions to dangerous political quandaries. It is for this rea-
son that I use the term architect of change to refer to such agents of political
transformation
The narrative presented in this section suggests that when beliefs rather
30than simply preferences or interests are relevant, then democratic systems
based on majority rule can maintain a kind of structural stability, balanced
between chaos and the rigidity of permanent equilibrium. The following
sections of the paper develop the formal model.
4 The Spatial Model of Politics
The electoral models based on the early work of Hotelling (1929) and Downs
(1957) essentially supposed that the motivation of parties is to win a majority
of the votes or seats. The predictions of these Downsian, vote maximizing,
models vary, but they tend to suggest that parties converge to an electoral
center. The simplest model assumes two parties and a one-dimensional pol-
icy space, X. If voters ￿deterministically￿choose the party with the nearest
policy position, then vote maximizing leads both parties to position them-
selves at the median of the electoral distribution. In higher dimensions, two
party pure strategy, vote maximizing Nash equilibria generally do not exist
and instability may occur. However, mixed strategy Nash equilibria do exist
and lie inside a subset of the policy space known as the uncovered set.4 These
￿attractors￿of the political process are centrally located with respect to the
distribution of voters￿ideal points. Such a conclusion seems at odds with
empirical evidence that parties do not exhibit such strong convergence to the
4McKelvey 1986; Banks, Duggan and LeBreton, 2002.
31electoral center.5
Empirical analyses of presidential elections (Poole and Rosenthal,1984)
using ￿stochastic￿vote models also found no evidence of convergence to an
electoral center. A formal basis for such stochastic models is provided by
the notion of ￿Quantal response equilibria￿(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995).
In such models, behavior of each voter is modeled by a vector of choice
probabilities.6 A standard result in this class of models is the mean voter
theorem -that all candidates converge to the electoral mean when they are
motivated to maximize vote share (McKelvey and Patty, 2004) or plurality
in the two party case (Banks and Duggan, 2005). An illustration of non-
convergence of presidential candidate positions is provided in Figure 2.7This
presents an analysis of the distribution of voter preferred points, obtained
from the national election survey for the Presidential election of 1964, to-
gether with estimated positions of the candidates, Johnson and Goldwater.
It can be seen in the ￿gure that the ￿estimated cleavage line￿does not go
through the origin, indicating asymmetry of some kind between the two can-
didates.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Research on elections in the Netherlands, Britain, Israel￿Italy the United
5Adams, 1999a,b, 2001; Adams and Merrill, 1999; Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Adams,
Merrill and Grofman, 2005.
6Hinich 1977; Enelow and Hinich 1982, 1984, 1989; Coughlin 1992; Lin, Enelow and
Dorussen, 1999.
7This ￿gure is taken from Scho￿eld Miller and Martin, 2003.
32States8, Argentina9 and Turkey10, has constructed multinomial conditional
probit (MNP) and logit (MNL) models and shown that the addition of can-
didate or party valence (Stokes, 1992) adds to the statistical signi￿cance of
the estimations. Valence, ￿j, is the electoral perception of the ￿quality￿of
a candidate or party leader of party, j. In empirical models this valence
can be assumed to be independent of the position of the party or candidate,
and simply re￿ ects the overall degree to which the party is perceived to have
shown itself able to govern e⁄ectively in the past, or is likely to be able to
govern well in the future (Penn, 2003). The early empirical model of Poole
and Rosenthal (1984) on U.S. Presidential elections included these valence
terms and noted that there was no evidence of candidate convergence. For-
mal models of elections incorporating valence have been developed recently
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Aragones and Palfrey, 2002, Groseclose,
2001), and the partial results that were obtained suggested that convergence
to an electoral center was unlikely.For example, Figure 3 gives an estimate of
party positions in the Israel Knesset in 1996, showing the tendency of parties
to align along a principal electoral axis.11
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 4 illustrates the estimated positions in the Netherlands at the re-
cent election of 2006. In this case both policy dimensions are equally relevant,
8Scho￿eld and Sened, 2005a,b, 2006; Scho￿eld Miller and Martin, 2003; Miller and
Scho￿eld, 2003; Scho￿eld and Miller, 2007.
9Scho￿eld and Cataife, 2007.
10Scho￿eld and Ozdemir, 2007.
11This ￿gure is taken from Scho￿eld, 2007d.
33and the parties scatter in all directions.12
[Figure 4 here]
The previous empirical analyses have now been complemented by theo-
retical results (Scho￿eld, 2006b, 2007a,b,c) which give cause to believe that
divergence in policy position is generic. Since it is usual to assume in em-
pirical models that the stochastic component of the model is associated with
errors or disturbances that have the ￿Type I extreme value distribution￿,
this assumption is imposed on the formal model (see Dow and Endersby
(2004). The Theorem obtains the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the
mean voter theorem to be valid when the candidates have di⁄ering valences.
These conditions are expressed in terms of a convergence coe¢ cient that can
be computed from the parameters of the empirical model, namely the valence
di⁄erences and the variance of the electoral distribution. When the su¢ cient
condition is satis￿ed, then all candidates will adopt vote maximizing posi-
tions at the electoral mean. When the necessary condition fails, then no
candidate will adopt such a position, and the candidate with the lowest va-
lence will chose the most radical policy position. This formal model has been
extended recently by Scho￿eld and Miller (2007) and Scho￿eld and Cataife
(2007) to take account of the in￿ uence of activists on party and candidate
positioning. See also Figure 5 for an illustration of how activism will pull
both candidates away from the electoral origin.13:Miller and Scho￿eld (2007)
12This ￿gure is taken from Scho￿eld 2007a..
13Miller and Scho￿eld, 2003; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997.
34suggest that U.S. politics is subject to incremental continuously "realigning"
forces induced by these activist coalitions, and acting in a clockwise direction
in the two-dimensional policy space.14
[Insert Figure 5 here]
They also argue that U.S. politics has become increasingly dominated
by the contributions from economic activists at R in ￿gure 5. The alliance
between socially conservative activists at C and big business, located at R,
has led to Repulican manipulation of electoral opinion, calling into question
the validity of Madison￿ s belief in the probability of a "￿t choice". 15
5 Concluding Remarks
The stochastic spatial model is a powerful tool for studying the interaction
between activists, political candidates and the electorate in a representative
democracy. Current research is directed at the analysis of the relationship
between electorally induced preferences and voting behavior by representa-
tives in polities with electoral systems based on plurality rule, as in Britain
and the United States, and contrasting the equilibria with those obtaining
in polities based on proportional representation, as in many European coun-
tries,as well as Israel and Turkey. In principle, the model can also be used
to examine the stability of authoritarian regimes (Scho￿eld and Levinson,
2007).
14Figure 5 is taken from Miller and Scho￿eld, 2007.
15See also Gore (2007).
35One of the long standing puzzles in the study of U.S. politics is why
precisely the plurality or majoritarian feature of the U.S. electoral system
generates a two party structure.16 I conjecture that the plurality system of
the US gives greater power to activists and this generally restricts political
competition to a two-party situation.
The use of proportional electoral methods can be seen as the reason for
the greater degree of political ￿fragmentation￿in European polities (Laver
and Scho￿eld, 1990). In fact, the stochastic electoral model shows that low
valence parties will tend to adopt distinctive positions at the electoral pe-
riphery. This can be seen very clearely in Israel and Turkey, for example.
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